Imagine Matthew on his motorcycle, a beautiful morning in the Texas Hill Country, an oak tree, a moment’s distraction.
Matthew misjudges a curve and slams into the tree; he is mangled, bleeding. Someone passes, calls 911. EMS arrives, and it is obvious that Matthew has suffered a major head injury: He is nonresponsive and unconscious. He is airlifted to a hospital, physicians stabilize and examine him, assess his injuries. A large portion of Matthew’s brain has been destroyed in the crash. The destruction is worst in the cerebrum, they say, the part of the brain that plays a central role in all those characteristics that make us human. The emergency room team recognizes that Matthew’s brain injuries are so extensive that he will never regain consciousness. The best outcome would be what they call a “persistent vegetative state.” Many frantic minutes later, Matthew is alive, but only by virtue of life-support equipment: a ventilator, IV nourishment, drugs to stabilize his body’s functions.
The medical staff now have time to think about what the EMT had told them as they took charge of Matthew: the “living will” found in Matthew’s jacket. They would later learn that Matthew never left home without it. The staff had only considered the principal directive, which the EMT had read to them: “Administer emergency intervention and life support as needed to prevent death, where ‘death’ means ‘the cessation of life as commonly understood.’” Matthew is stable; now they can turn to his other directives.
In the event he becomes incapacitated, Matthew instructs his sisters, Alexandria and Bethany, to determine jointly what course of treatment should be administered. He specifically states that they must agree, “after due deliberation, taking account of all available information.”
The attending physician has Matthew transferred to the intensive care unit and calls for the hospital social worker, who will have the task of contacting the sisters. According to Matthew’s instructions, there is nothing more for the medical staff to do but wait for the sisters to arrive. Only they are authorized to decide what to do next.
The social worker calls the two sisters and informs them about Matthew's accident. He reassures them: Matthew is stable at this point, though his injuries are extremely serious. They have time to come to the hospital. Three quiet hours pass.
Though the sisters come from different cities, they arrive within minutes of one another. The charge nurse and the social worker are just escorting Alexandria to the conference room to review Matthew’s condition when Bethany arrives on the floor. As they continue down the hall, Alexandria and Bethany exchange a half-hearted greeting. They all sit down at a conference table. The nurse speaks first.
“I’m afraid Matthew’s injuries are . . . very serious. He is stable, but he is totally nonresponsive. He has suffered a severe brain injury, and we estimate that more than eighty percent of his cerebrum was destroyed. The destruction was most severe in the frontal lobe, the part of his brain that made him the person he was.”
“The person he was!” Bethany exclaims. “You’re talking like there’s no hope, like he’s already gone!”
“What she means,” Alexandria offers, “is that most of his brain is gone.” She pauses. “It can’t be fixed, and it won’t grow back.” No one spoke.
“Won’t he wake up?”
Matthew’s attending physician walks into the conference room. She takes a seat and looks down. She had heard Alexandria’s question.
“I’m Dr. Home, Matthew’s doctor in the neuro intensive care unit. Matthew is stable, but at this point, it appears that Matthew’s brain injuries are too extensive for him ever to regain consciousness. We are keeping him alive, and we can probably keep him alive indefinitely. It will take some time for to see how stable he is.” Dr. Home looks from Bethany to Alexandria. “But at this point, that’s all we can do.”
“I know this is hard for you,” the social worker adds, “but you need all the information we have — given Matthew’s . . . instructions.”
“What do you mean?!” the sisters say, together.
“Well,” he continues, handing them the worn pages, “Matthew’s living will. . . . He has given you durable power of attorney — both of you, jointly. He wants you to agree on what we should do — whether we should continue to treat him, or . . . .”
“Or pull the plug?” Bethany says, looking at Alexandria.
Alexandria and Bethany lean back from the table. Their initial reaction had naturally been shock, then sadness. Hours had passed since the call. They had seen Matthew, they had traced the tubes and wires back to the machines that were keeping him alive, and they had reviewed the growing heap of charts and reports that were brought in and deposited on the conference table. Though they had talked very little, they had begun to realize that their problem did not lie in these reports and test results and vital signs.
It had dawned on each of them that the facts of Matthew’s condition were tangled with deeper issues, issues they know they can avoid only so long. Once they saw this, they knew that their initial question — the question that had been obvious from the beginning — was just that: a beginning.
Should Matthew be “unplugged”? They knew this would result in fairly immediate death, but they also knew that Matthew could be kept alive — “perhaps indefinitely,” hadn’t Dr. Home said? — by means of life-support equipment. What is to be done?
Time and again they had asked themselves silently what had motivated Matthew to do this, to give them this responsibility. “According to my wishes, my sisters must make this decision jointly: They must agree on what is to be done.” They had read this sentence until they could recite it by heart. “They must agree.” What could Matthew have wanted?
“Let’s go have something to eat, maybe some coffee,” Alexandria suggests, at last. She hopes there will be a way to understand.
In the cafeteria, Alexandria chooses a table near the window. No trouble, she thinks; it’s not crowded at three in the morning. As they sip their coffee and try to eat a vending machine breakfast, Alexandria ventures an appraisal.
“This is how I see it, Beth. Matthew. . . . Matthew was produced by . . . well, by brain processes. Maybe Matthew just was those processes. Now, his brain . . . Well, there’s no brain there to process much of anything. So, from the moment Matthew’s brain was destroyed, Matthew stopped being, uh . . . Matthew, I guess. You know what I mean? Since his brain is gone, he is gone. We can’t change that by keeping his body alive.”
“How can you say that?” Bethany retorts. “Is that all there was, just a brain? What about what makes Matthew the unique person he is? You can’t just throw that away because his brain isn’t functioning!”
“Beth, I just meant . . . . Well, it’s just that, if his brain can’t be repaired, then he’s already gone. What else can we do?”
“His brain is gone — he’s not gone.”
Alexandria was puzzled. “What do you mean?”
“Matthew isn’t gone, even if his brain is destroyed. You aren’t looking at the whole picture. You think that just because his brain is gone there’s no more Matthew.”
“Uh — well, yes. What else is there?”
Bethany stared at her sister, stunned. “His soul — Matthew’s soul. That’s what makes him the person he is, not just a brain doing whatever in his skull! You have to look at everything, not just CAT scans and blood tests!”
Alexandria doesn’t know what to make of this. “How can we tell anything about souls?”
“Matthew's soul — who he is — it’s only temporarily in his body. I mean, while the body is alive,” Bethany says, “the bond between body and soul hasn’t been broken. Pulling the plug and letting his body die — that’s breaking the bond, cutting the tie between his body and his soul. What if it’s too soon?” Bethany stared out the window, into the night. “What if we’re wrong?”
Alexandria is completely at a loss. “How is it wrong? How can we be wrong if Matthew’s brain is gone? What good will it do to keep him alive artificially? Not even him — just a . . . a shell.”
”We know his brain is damaged,” Beth says. “What I mean is, what if we’re wrong for letting him die — for making him die? Won’t we be murderers?”
The sisters have been up all night, trying to digest the information that swirled around them in the hospital conference room. They watch the sun rise over Matthew’s city; for the first time, they feel how exhausted they are.
One of the nurses — they don’t know her name — suggests they get some rest; after all, Matthew’s condition is stable. “There’s really nothing to do now,” Alexandria acknowledges, but then she suddenly realizes that they had everything to do. Bethany’s face told Alexandria that she knew, too. But how do they do this? Where do they even begin?
Bethany offered to drive to Matthew’s apartment, and Alexandria was grateful. Alexandria turns on the radio, possibly to avoid any more discussion, at least for now. She hunts for a classical station; some Bach would be nice. Matthew loves Bach.
Loved, she corrects herself, glancing at Bethany. And then, Is it “loves” or “loved”? she asks herself. That’s the problem, isn’t it?
The sisters pause awkwardly as Alexandria fishes in her purse for a key she has never needed before. She unlocks the blue door to Matthew’s apartment, and they are greeted by Martin, Matthew’s beloved cat.
Bethany watches Alexandria search the pantry for cat food. Once Martin is at work on his very late dinner, the sisters make their way to the living room. Everywhere they look, they see Matthew: ritual masks he collected from all over the world, his photos of Mesoamerican archaeological sites and artifacts, and of course, the books. Alexandria stares down at the coffee table, one of those glass-panel tables with a space underneath for displaying nick-knacks. Matthew had put the drawing Pete had done for his tattoo under the glass. Alexandria laughed. “I always teased him about that. Why keep a drawing of a tattoo that’s living on your arm?!” Bethany laughed, too.
After a long moment of trying to read the expression in the tattoo-snake’s eyes, Bethany said, “Well, I think I’ll just . . . .” She glanced toward the second bedroom, and then at Matthew’s room.
“It’s fine, Beth. I don’t mind.”
Although she is exhausted, Bethany is unable to sleep. After who-knows-how-much tossing and studying the ceiling fan, she gives up and wanders into the living room. Matthew’s bedroom door is closed.
How can she sleep in there? Bethany asks herself. She picks up the book on the floor leaning against the couch. What a surprise, she thinks. It would have to be Aristotle. She opens the book. Greek, too. He’s just not normal. By this point, Martin has joined her in Matthew’s favorite chair, indicating that he requires petting. She obliges.
“Sorry, Martin,” she whispers at last, getting up. Martin hops back into the chair and curls up, unperturbed. Bethany wanders into the kitchen. Maybe I’ll have some tea, Bethany coaches herself, not really feeling like tea.
Even so, the tea is soothing, and she soon turns to wandering through Matthew’s apartment. Finding herself sitting at the desk in Matthew’s study, she absent-mindedly hits the space bar of the keyboard. Matthew’s workstation comes to life. A webpage is open: “Matthew’s Instructional Web,” it says, in large letters. She wonders if the summer semester is under way, and she makes a mental note that they will need to notify Matthew’s department chair.
Bethany clicks the link to “Current Courses.” Let’s see what he’s been up to this spring.
Hmm, she thinks, he’s been busy. Philosophy of religion, logic, introduction to philosophy. She reads the course instructions, and clicks a link.
Alexandria had finally managed to drift off in Matthew’s room, a lifetime of his quirks and sarcastic comments swirling around her. “Holy shit!” she hears, as if from very far away. “Holy shit! Holy shit!”
Alexandria realizes it isn’t a dream; it’s her sister. She bolts into the living room, following the voice. Martin looks up in his Why-are-you-getting-worked-up? sort of way. “Holy shit!” The voice — Beth’s voice, Matthew’s study.
Alexandria finds her staring into the monitor. “What is it?” she asks. Bethany is frozen. “What?”
Bethany seems to have to will herself to look away. Their eyes meet, and Bethany only manages to whisper, “Look . . . I . . . . It’s . . . I can’t. . . .” She gets up, in a trance, gesturing toward the monitor. “Just . . . look.”
Alexandria takes the seat. She scrolls to the top of the page Bethany has been reading.
It was a beautiful morning of motorcycling in the Texas Hill Country interrupted by a moment’s distraction.
Matthew misjudges a curve and slams into the tree; he is mangled, bleeding. Someone passes, calls 911. EMS arrives, and it is obvious that Matthew has suffered a major head injury: he is nonresponsive and unconscious, but alive. He is airlifted to a hospital; physicians examine him and assess his injuries. A large portion of Matthew’s brain has been destroyed in the crash. The destruction is worst in the cerebrum, they say — the part of the brain that plays a central role in all those characteristics that make us human. The emergency room team recognizes that Matthew’s brain injuries are so extensive that he will never regain consciousness. The best outcome would be a “persistent vegetative state.” Many frantic minutes later, Matthew is alive, but only by virtue of life-support equipment: a ventilator, IV nourishment, drugs to stabilize his body’s functions.
Alexandria is stunned. She skims a bit, and then:
In the event he becomes incapacitated, Matthew instructs his sisters, Alexandria and Bethany, to determine jointly what course of treatment should be administered. He specifically states that they must agree, “after due deliberation, taking account of all available information.”
She looks up at her sister. Bethany is still staring at the screen.
The attending physician has Matthew transferred to the critical care unit and calls for the hospital social worker, who is given the task of contacting the sisters. According to Matthew’s instructions, there is nothing for the medical staff to do now but wait for the sisters to arrive. Only they are authorized to decide what to do next.
“How the hell did he know?” Bethany asks. As tired as they were, the sisters had taken turns reading Matthew’s first intro to philosophy lecture, and now they were sitting in Matthew’s kitchen pretending to eat. “How?”
“He didn’t know, Beth. This is some weird coincidence.”
“It’s more than weird. It’s totally creepy.” Bethany pauses. “You know he’s talking about himself. About us.”
“Come on. He wrote that story for his philosophy class. He wasn’t foretelling the future. It’s about a fictional us.”
“How do you know?” Bethany asked. “It could be. Maybe he knew.”
“There’s no reason to think he knew the future,” Alexandria exclaims, a little more vigorously than she intends. “But he obviously thought about this . . . situation,” she added, more gently.
“Yeah,” Bethany replies, overlooking Alexandria’s rebuke. “A lot.”
They try to eat some pickled herring, one of Matthew’s favorite lunches. “How does he eat this three times a week?” Bethany realizes she asked aloud and glances at Alexandria, who is intently staring out the little window. “What is it?” Bethany asks gently.
“Well,” Alexandria begins, “maybe . . . Uh, maybe this is for us.”
“What do you mean?”
“He always wanted us to talk philosophy. Remember?” Bethany nods. “Maybe in some weird way this is for us.”
“You mean, he left us . . . like, what to do?” Bethany says.
“That’s his class material, Beth. Would he teach intro to philosophy this way to tell us what to do, just in case he happens to wreck his bike?”
“I don’t know. Maybe.”
“That’s not what I mean. I mean, it’s for us, but not . . . well, not just for us. That is his course material, but maybe it’s also a clue. At least, we might. . . . Well, maybe you’re right. Maybe we’ll find out what we do.”
“You mean, us in the story, in his course?”
“Yes, exactly.”
“So you’re saying we — I mean, you and I, the real us — we should. . . ?
Alexandria finishes her thought. “Maybe we need to . . . uh, sort of, take his course.”
They risk giving Martin a really impressive between-meal snack, leave the herring where it is, and return to Matthew’s study. “You first,” Bethany says, pulling up a chair. Alexandria’s sits down and taps a key, bringing the workstation back to life.
“What’s next?” Bethany asks.
Alexandria clicks back to the table of contents. “We finished The Quandary. Should we just go on?” She looks at Bethany, who nods. Alexandria clicks Invitation to Philosophy.
σωφρονεῖν ἀρετὴ μεγίστη καὶ σοφίη ἀληθέα λέγειν καὶ ποιεῖν κατὰ φύσιν ἐπαΐοντας.
Understanding is the greatest excellence, and wisdom is speaking truth and acting according to the nature of things.
Herakleitos, DK 112, my translation
In an introductory course, the first order of business would seem to be to identify the subjectmatter to be surveyed. In most cases, this task is fairly straightforward. If you sign up for a course introducing poetry or human anatomy, for instance, you have a pretty good idea what the course will be about, so raising a question like what the course is going to be about might seem silly. But in philosophy it’s not silly to ask a question like this: There are philosophical reasons why we need to ask what philosophy is; we’ll talk more about that shortly.
At any rate, the best practical reason for such a basic question may be that most people aren’t too sure what philosophy is anyway. In fact, when people ask me what I do for a living, and I tell them I teach philosophy, they often think (after the usual jokes about my being a philosopher) that I teach psychology. So, it makes some sense to start by asking, What is philosophy?
Whenever we ask a question like "What is X?" we usually expect the answer to be something like a definition. There are plenty of details to sort out, but a definition of, say, human anatomy isn’t likely to be much of a controversy among people who teach it. In philosophy, however, this approach is problematic, mainly because different philosophical schools and traditions have been hard-headed about their own definitions of philosophy. And even worse, from a particular point of view, armed with a particular definition of philosophy, other definitions may be labeled as fatally flawed, silly, or, worse yet, as not even "real" philosophy.
So, what should I do to introduce philosophy to you? Should I give you a list of schools and their definitions? Would that take us to the heart of philosophy? I have reservations about that approach. In the competing voices, it seems to me something vital is lost.
One way through this mess might be for me to tell you which of these schools is correct. But again, each of the schools is convinced that it is the right way to do philosophy, and that conviction is usually accompanied by an equally deep conviction that everyone else is off base. So, if I introduce you to philosophy by giving you my definition of philosophy, others may justly accuse me of stacking the deck in my favor. And if we use my definition, I may even be cheating you out of seeing the richness (and rancor) that philosophy really is.
The lack of agreement among philosophers, even about very basic issues, has not gone unnoticed. Some people have taken this as an indication that there’s nothing going on in philosophy important enough to justify wasting time trying to figure out what philosophy is. People have even argued that there is no such thing as philosophy to begin with. Some of them argue that philosophy is actually a confused and nasty habit of language — and the sooner we all give up such bad habits, the better. Oddly enough, when they give reasons for this claim, they give us — Are you ready for this? — philosophical arguments!
I am not one of those philosophers who reject philosophy, but I do recognize that trying to give an answer to the "simple" question, "What is philosophy?" is already a philosophical problem. Let me help you see why.
People who argue that philosophy is alive and well, and those who think philosophy is a bad habit that should be broken — and every one else in between — all have views that depend on particular ways of thinking about the world (the “Big Picture"). So, a lot is riding on whose view of the “Big Picture" is correct. Even philosophers who argue that we can never know whose view is correct have reasons why we can't know, and those reasons themselves seem to depend on some view of the Big Picture. So actually, you can't reject philosophy without being philosophical about it.
The striking thing about all these claims about philosophy is that the sorts of things people say to support their claims are similar in certain ways, even if it's only a family resemblance. This suggests that doing philosophy may be what they all have in common, rather than some body of established "philosophical facts" or definitions.
Suppose I go out on a limb here and say that what's important in philosophy is the methodology. Let’s call it “thinking philosophically” — which of course is no help in defining philosophy. Nevertheless, suppose we agree that looking at doing philosophy is a better approach than giving definitions, even though there will still be disagreement among schools of philosophy. Now what?
We could start our investigation by focusing on how philosophers do philosophy: We could examine tools and methods for doing that kind of thinking — argument, conceptual analysis — the list is long. That would allow us to bypass, at least for now, the controversies about which doctrines are correct. So far, so good.
But thinking of tools and methods for thinking makes me wonder: What in the World is there to think philosophically about? If we don’t pay some attention to that first question, we’ll end up with beautifully refined tools, but we won’t know what they are for. We’ll have no job to do with them.
It may seem that we aren't making progress, since we have just backed away from two main ways of approaching philosophy, definition and method. Actually, if we become convinced that a particular approach is heading the wrong way, then we have made some progress: At least we won't keep banging our heads on the same wall. A lot of philosophy has been about trying to figure out what the right questions are. So, if we can eliminate some questions because they get us off on the wrong foot, we are that much ahead. In the previous section, I’m really arguing that the question What is the definition of “philosophy”? is one of those questions that puts us on the wrong path.
One of my reasons for rejecting that wrong path is that it may lead us to conclude that the “norm” of philosophy is our philosophy — the Western tradition. Most of our course will indeed focus on the Western philosophical tradition, but we need to keep constantly in mind that it’s a very big world out there, and there are many philosophical traditions that offer deep insight into human existence. One of the benefits of rejecting questions that seem to stack the deck in favor of one tradition or school is that we can be open to more possibilities.
Still, eliminating questions that obviously lead to problems doesn't really get us very far either. We need a clue, and I'm ready to propose one. Let’s set aside the problem of saying what philosophy is and what it does, and and let’s see what it is that gets philosophy going in the first place — "from the inside." This will also be a departure from the usual teaching strategy. Instead of the teacher-just-tell-me-the-answer method, let me conjure up an experience of philosophy and invite you to get involved in it, so you can start to get a grip on doing philosophy yourself. Here's the clue:
Let's begin at the beginning. Why would anyone start thinking philosophically? Where does philosophical thinking come from? What kicks it off? What do we think we will get for our efforts?
This is where Alexandria and Bethany come in. In their story, Matthew and his living will have given Alexandria and Bethany a lot to think about. No doubt they realize that their initial question (whether to pull the plug) is only the beginning. The real controversy runs much deeper, even though they may not see it until their deliberations take them beneath the surface of their quandary.
As you probably saw, Alexandria subscribes to what we might be tempted to call a "scientific” world view, according to which the person Matthew is whatever Matthew is physically. All his characteristics, however lofty or noble, are rooted in his bodily nature. On her view, there is nothing else to consider than these “scientific” facts, since such facts exhaust what there is to say about Matthew and his condition. Having reviewed the physicians’ findings and diagnosis — the relevant facts in this case — Alexandria asserts that the answer is really rather simple: No brain process means no more Matthew, and no hope of viable brain process means no hope for Matthew. Unplug what's left and make room for someone else. The person Matthew is already gone. However significant it may be for other reasons, Alexandria believes that allowing Matthew's body to die does not amount to allowing Matthew to die: by this point, the person Matthew has already ceased to exist.
Bethany stops reading and turns to Alexandria. “Is that what you really think? Is that — the Alex in the story — is that you”?
Alexandria slowly nods. “This is creepy, Beth. Really creepy, but . . . well, yes. That is what I think. The body. . . . Well, not just the body. Really, a body that is still functioning, uh, properly, I guess — that’s what makes the person who they are.”
Bethany stares at Alexandria — or more correctly stares through Alexandria. They turn back to the monitor. “So, what about me?” she whispers.
Bethany rejects this appraisal of the situation. She never denies the importance of the physical world and the "medical facts"; it’s just that, for her, they don't tell the whole story. On Bethany’s view, things beyond the world of our senses must be taken into account as well. Bethany claims that the real Matthew is rooted in a particular sort of being that is not touched with the hand or seen with the eye. That being is a soul. She is reluctant to pull the plug because there is no doubt in her mind that severing the tie between a living body and a soul is a momentous event. Surely breaking that tie will affect the "career" of the soul: Will it benefit that soul on its journey? Or would it be an interruption of that journey? And she has an additional concern: Is she placing herself in moral jeopardy as well? What if it is murder?
Alexandria has trouble getting her head around Bethany’s view because, to put it simply, she sees that the person Matthew ended at the moment that his brain’s functions can no longer produce and sustain that person. Bethany’s reaction to Alexandria is that Alexandria is abandoning Matthew, but obviously that’s because she thinks that Matthew still exists to be abandoned. In one sense, the sisters are looking at the same “facts”; in another sense, they experience different worlds — worlds in which different things demand to be included in their deliberations. At first — meaning, before they do much philosophical thinking — their views slip past each other, like those proverbial ships in the night.
The sisters seem to have stopped breathing. These words — Matthew’s words — had given their reactions more definite shapes. “He’s right,” Bethany says, still whispering. “That’s us, that’s . . . me. I just thought you were being heartless, but you really think he’s gone, don’t you? I mean, really gone.”
“Yes.” Alexandria whispers too. She takes a long breath, reflecting on the silliness of whispering. Who’s going to be disturbed? she thinks.
“And I just thought you were being . . .” Alexandria considers the word carefully. “Sentimental. Like, you didn’t want this to be true.”
“But it is true,” Bethany says, recovering her voice, too. “Matthew needs us to . . .”
Bethany doesn’t finish. They are lost in thought.
“Beth, think about what you just said.”
“What? That Matthew needs us?”
“Yes, but about it being true. What is true?”
“What is that supposed to mean?” Bethany says.
“We agree on a lot of things. Those things are true, right?”
“About him? Like, the accident? That sort of thing?”
“Yes,” Alexandria says. “But you also said ‘Matthew needs us’ — that’s only true if you are right.”
“Right?” Bethany asks.
“Yes. Don’t you see? This is our problem, this is what Matthew is talking about in this insane, creepy lecture. You can only say ‘Matthew needs us’ if you’re right that Matthew still exists. Otherwise. . . .”
Bethany nods. “Otherwise,” she says, “Matthew doesn’t need anything, because there’s no Matthew. And that’s just what you said.” They look at each other for a long time, trying to digest what they were dealing with.
“What do we do now?”
ἐὰν μὴ ἔλπηται ἀνέλπιστον οὐκ ἐξευρήσει, ἀνεξερεύνητον ἐὸν καὶ ἄπορον.
Expect the unexpected or you will not find it — unsearchable and impassible.
Herakleitos, DK 18, my translation
A bit of reflection on the sisters’ story brings to light that their disagreement runs much deeper than a dispute over what should be done. Future action is definitely in dispute here, but the more substantial disagreement is over how to approach the question of what should be done. Alexandria and Bethany bring to this question different — perhaps incompatible — views of what must be taken into account in looking for an answer. Since this is my thought experiment, let me further stipulate that, contrary to U.S. custom, Bethany and Alexandria decide to deliberate together rather than file lawsuits. It seems inevitable that, at some point in their discussion, they must face this divergence of beliefs on what counts in deliberation. When they do, things are going to get interesting.
Naturally, they will start with the question of what to do about Matthew’s instructions. As Alexandria makes her case for throwing out what’s left of Matthew, she will appeal to "facts" about the situation. The sort of fact Alexandria is going to admit will be the tangible, "see-for-yourself" kind. We’ve already noticed that is the sort of thinking people commonly associate with science. Bethany may very well accept those facts, but she will argue that facts of that sort are not the only things in the world that count; there’s more to it than what we can see or touch.
But what happens when Alexandria demands that Bethany produce evidence for souls? The cards seem to be stacked against Bethany by Alexandria’s criteria for what counts as ”evidence." For Alexandria, the only sort of evidence that should count is the tangible sort, and that is exactly what Bethany cannot produce, since, according to her view, souls, by definition, are not physical, tangible things in the world. So, it appears that further discussion of what to do with Matthew or Matthew's body will be hindered by what each is willing to admit into the discussion as evidence.
Things are no better for Bethany. She will assume that souls must count, and when Alexandria balks, Bethany may well demand that Alexandria prove that material things are the only things that count. It’s so obvious to Bethany that souls exist that no argument from the “facts” will dissuade her. To Bethany, factual arguments about Matthew aren’t wrong; they are just incomplete.
If the discussion is to proceed, then, it will have to move to an even deeper level, the level of trying to ascertain what should count in the deliberation. Here open the Gates of Philosophy.
A little thought will enable you to see that if they are to make progress in determining what should count, they need to find out what sorts of things there are in the world that might count.
Actually, they need to know a lot more — like how we know about those basic sorts of things, how they fit together, why appealing to some them "works" in giving explanations and deciding on how to act, and so on. Like the sisters, we will think a lot more about these matters as our exploration unfolds.
To think about these issues, the sisters need to know what might count, and to find out, they will need to investigate the "big picture" of the world — in other words, they will find themselves asking about the ultimate nature of reality.
At the outset, each of the sisters knows (or thinks she knows) what there is in the world and what counts in deliberation. Borrowing a term from the great Spanish philosopher, Ortega y Gassett, let's call a perspective or view of the biggest possible Big Picture a basic orientation in the world. It’s very tricky to spell out what we mean by “basic orientation,” but Ortega gives us a clue: It’s everything we count on as we navigate in the world. To grossly oversimplify, Alexandria counts on material things to tell the whole story, but Bethany counts on both material things and at least one sort of nonmaterial thing, souls. That’s how each of them “makes her way,” navigating around the world. It’s what we count on in the world that orients us.
So now we are in a position to see that the sisters' deepest problem is that they disagree about basic orientation in the world. When we think about things in this way, we see that the sisters’ initial disagreement about what to do about Matthew (Bethany’s view) or about Matthew’s body (Alexandria’s view) leads them all the way down to questions about the ultimate nature of reality. We might say that what they will have to look for is the (a?) proper basic orientation — the "best" or "most true" or something of the sort. What is the right way to find your way around in the world?
Here is where the really serious problems begin: Since everything we think we know depends on some basic orientation, what does it mean to say that a basic orientation is "true" or "best"? How can basic orientations be compared? Do we even know that they can they be compared? Or does each basic orientation stand by itself, entirely apart from all others?
And how can they stand apart from each other? Think about Bethany and Alexandria: Their basic orientations seem compatible when we’re fixing a leaky pipe or cooking dinner. In fact, if it weren’t for Matthew’s living will, would they ever have known how much they disagree about what is ultimately real?
So it happens that Alexandria and Bethany must ask questions that lie at the heart of philosophy:
In the Western philosophical tradition, the branch of philosophy that deals with theories of reality is metaphysics, and the branch that deals with matters of knowledge is epistemology. The third question gets at the heart of the third branch, value theory.I envision Alexandria and Bethany in an argument about metaphysics and epistemology and value, with Matthew — or Matthew’s body, depending on your basic orientation — lying nearby, oblivious to it all.
You may find this hard to believe, but I have not told this story to invite you to take sides.
We obviously have serious questions about whose view is correct (whatever "correct" might mean when applied to a basic orientation), but we aren’t sure — at least not at this early stage — how to approach this question. There will be time for that debate (and others). And I do not expect you to understand every bit of the "technicalities" of these philosophical reflections; there will be time for that as well.
What I am trying to show you is that we can (and we do: Ask Alexandria and Bethany!) encounter situations that invite us to think philosophically, all the way down. This is an improvement over giving definitions or stipulating methods, because it points to the human need that philosophy answers. Even better, this allows us to see other philosophical traditions in the light of our common human experience.
Consider this poem:
It is true that we leave, truly we part.
We leave the flowers, the songs, and the earth.
It is true that we go; it is true that we part!. . .
Where do we go, aoh! Where do we go?
Are we dead beyond, or do we yet live?
Will there be existence again?
Will the joy of the Giver of Life be there again?(Cantares Mexicanos, fol 61.r)
This poem was written in Classical Nahuatl by poet-philosophers who were examining the deepest questions and longings of the human condition. As you reflect on this poem, consider this: The tradition that produced this poem was the Aztec culture, long before contact with Europeans or the Conquest. In case you’re inclined to think, “Well, that’s poetry,” consider the fact that the Western philosophical tradition originated in poetry too: Hesiod and Homer, for instance.
One of the most striking things about this poem from a “distant” culture in a language that most of us have only encountered in the traces it left on Spanish and, eventually English (words like avocado, for instance!) — one of the most striking things about it is that it asks a profoundly human question: Is this it? Or is there something beyond this life?
This is my strongest argument for starting our course not with a definition or a set of “critical thinking” tools, but in the trenches of human experience, where we ask the often-anguished questions that prompt philosophizing in the first place. This approach allows us to see beyond our own artificial boundaries, perhaps to glimpse a common human desire for understanding, for orientation in the world, for meaning.
In such situations, we are forced beyond what counts and what we count on in our own basic orientation, to consider other possibilities. We may even end up having to examine what it means to have a basic orientation in the world. It can be quite uncomfortable.
And speaking of comfort, notice that neither science nor religion can help the sisters resolve these questions — or us. As powerfully orienting as science and religion can be, each already depends on a particular basic orientation within which it makes sense. In fact, it seems that, from inside a basic orientation it hardly makes sense to question the foundations of that orientation. Asking that sort of question is like asking, “Do material things exist in the world?” When you’re holding a cup of espresso, the answer is just obvious.
From “inside” the arena of a basic orientation, the bits and pieces of that basic orientation have a claim on us that seems self-evident and self-justifying. To Bethany, it’s plainly obvious that souls count in the deliberation; but it’s equally obvious to Alexandria that they can’t — because there aren’t any souls to count.
If you think about it, questioning one’s basic orientation is like using a map to find your way around a city, and then — standing on Main Street in broad daylight — asking, "What if this map is wrong?" It’s only when we encounter situations that force us through the gates of philosophy that we start asking questions that might seem absurd the rest of the time, when things are going smoothly.
Think of Alexandria and Bethany’s quandary as a signpost pointing toward this unfamiliar territory: That is where our exploration will take us.
At the end of the previous section, I gave you some questions to consider — “conversation starters.” While it can (and I hope it will be!) entertaining to have these conversations, there’s actually a point to these questions: They help you exercise your philosophical thinking skills. Just like other forms of exercise, it’s not a “one and done” proposal: You have to keep at it, if you want to get stronger.
This is a brief exercise designed to get you going. After you have read (and thought about!) Bethany and Alexandria’s quandary, and after you’ve had a few conversations about their situation, work through these questions. You are not required to submit this exercise, but you might want to consider discussing your thoughts with your classmates.
One of the most basic skills you will need in this course is careful, thoughtful listening, which means paying attention to what someone is actually saying (as opposed to what you would like someone to be saying!). A “grounded summary” is essentially reporting what you hear with evidence to back it up.
Note that people “say” things in lots of ways, like live speaking or in writing, so reading should be viewed as listening, too. At any rate, a grounded summary helps you focus on exactly what the story says. Be sure to check your answers against what the story actually says about the sisters' situation — and what the sisters themselves actually say. If you cannot point to a specific things you “heard — a particular sentence from the text, for instance — to support what you report in your summary, then you need to consider the possibility that you are projecting your own views or wishes into their story. And if you are, then you are not listening to their story; you're listening to your own story!
Each of the main bullets (in bold) below proposes an area of investigation for your summary. The questions that follow are intended to help you deepen and respond to the main question.
If you are thinking, How can I listen without letting what I already know and believe influence what I hear?, then you have just asked one of the most difficult — and one of the most interesting — questions about being a human being. Can we really "shut off" everything we know, every experience we've had, every belief, attitude — everything that might influence what we hear from someone else?
Of course not — and if we did somehow listen as a completely blank slate, then we wouldn't hear anything at all! We need our own knowledge and experience to interpret anything!
So, what is the difference between the kind of listening we are trying to exercise and the kind of listening that isn't listening? This is a very tricky issue, but one main ingredient in listening is to treat our understanding as hypothetical and keep checking. If we keep asking questions to check our interpretations, then we are less likely to listen in a way that blocks understanding. That’s what “grounded” means in “grounded summary.” It's not as easy as it sounds — as we shall see.
One of the greatest barriers to understanding another person or learning a new viewpoint is that we navigate the world as if our own perspective of the world is the most natural and therefore “correct” view anyone could take. Sometimes, in order to understand the point of view of another person, it is necessary to "suspend" your own convictions temporarily so they don't get in the way of understanding. To do this effectively, we need to identify exactly what our deep convictions are. Learning to clarify own own deep convictions and presuppositions is a skill that grounded summary helps you exercise, sort of like shadow-boxing. Grounded summary always involves contrasting what we’rehearing with what we already believe.
So, let’s investigate our own convictions a bit:
Let's assume that the two sisters take Matthew seriously and decide to reason out their problem (instead of filing lawsuits or having lots of therapy, for instance):
Have you made a sincere effort to respond to these questions? If so, you’re ready to go on.
“This is what I thought. This is . . . for us,” Bethany says. “Well, sort of for us. He’s exploring our perspectives, but in a way that leads to. . . .”
“What does it lead to?” Alexandria asks, after a long pause.
“I don’t know, Alex.” Bethany stared at a neat little row of mechanical pencils. Why does he buy these when he never writes anything down? He lives on his computer! she thought. “It’s like he’s inside my head,” she continued. “But he’s thinking about what my beliefs mean in ways I really never thought about — like that thing about the facts not telling the whole story.”
“Me, too. And that point about looking at the same facts but . . . but seeing a different . . . world.”
“Weird.” Bethany shudders.
“But there is a point to it, right?” Alexandria asked, not quite meaning to voice this question.
“It’s Introduction to Philosophy — there has to be a point to it!”
“Sure, I know it’s a course — not that sort of point. What I mean is. . . .” Alexandria pauses.
Bethany tries to help. “Do you mean, like telling us what he wanted?”
“No,” Alexandria continues, “I don’t mean that. Well, that’s sort of my point. Suppose he just teaches philosophy — is he going to tell the students what to think? Like, all that stuff about what counts and what’s really . . . real.”
“But it has to end somewhere,” Bethany says.
“The course has to end, but Matthew doesn’t have to resolve anything. Remember? I always made fun of him for turning everything into an endless series of questions. Maybe that’s all there is, in the end. Questions.”
That possibility had been lurking in their minds. Where is Matthew taking them in all this?
“What’s next?” Alexandria asks, at last.
“After the ‘Philosophical Thinking 101’ there’s a link. Oh, look. It goes to a discussion board.”
“With students? Should we be looking at this?”
“There is something weird about looking at this stuff,” Bethany muses. “But under the circumstances?”
“Yeah, I guess.” Alexandria hesitates. “Well, what else can we do? Let’s see what happens.”
Bethany skims the threads. “Listen to this!” she exclaims suddenly.
Student: The sisters have serious issues since childhood — they have a lot of conflict. It’s really extreme, but maybe Matthew wrecked his bike to get his sisters to resolve their conflicts.
“Do we have a lot of conflict?” Alexandria asks, surprised. “Matthew always wanted us to talk philosophy — but he always wanted everybody to talk philosophy!”
“Yes,” Bethany mused. “If this . . . situation . . . hadn’t come up, we wouldn’t even know that we see things so differently, like he said.”
They pause. “Does Matthew reply?” Alexandria asks.
Matthew: It's very tempting to focus on psychoanalyzing the sisters (and Matthew!) to try to understand their motives and decisions. But think hard about this: Will understanding their childhoods better solve the sisters' philosophical problem about whether souls are persons that exist independently of bodies?
Suppose someone believes that the world is flat. We can investigate that person's childhood, examine childhood experiences and traumas that motivate them to hold this view, and even analyze the comfort they derive in "knowing" the world is flat. It might be very interesting, even therapeutic, but none of that understanding changes the fact that the world is not flat, right?
“What the hell is he trying to tell them?” Bethany asks, exasperated but perplexed.
“I guess . . .” Alexandria starts. “Maybe it’s a warning not to get caught up in . . . in . . .”
“Yeah,” Bethany says, a bit sarcastically. “In . . . what?”
“In anything that isn’t a . . . a real answer. You know, like he was saying in the Invitation. We can’t just let science or religion or our personal — uh, convictions? — have the last word. It’s about . . .”
“About what’s true?” Bethany asks, unsure. She turns back to the discussion board.
Student: The sisters are in a terrible position, but they need to do what’s right for Matthew. They should put aside their own beliefs and just concentrate on what Matthew wanted.
“That’s a good point,” Alexandria says.
“Yeah, it’s a good point until you hear this,” Bethany says, resuming.
Matthew: It’s tempting to try to resolve the quandary by asking what Matthew wanted, but will that move work? After all, Matthew expressed what he wanted in his living will, didn’t he? Actually, we know what Matthew wanted, because he tells us by writing a living will before it was needed: He wants the sisters to work it out. Don’t look for an easy way out. There’s nothing ahead of the sisters but hard thinking.
“Damn,” Alexandria sighs. “He doesn’t take prisoners, does he?”
“No,” Bethany replies.
“So, those sisters . . . are . . .”
“The real sisters, too.” Bethany adds, still reading. “Wow. This is intense.”
“What? Let me see!”
Student: There are two sides to this story. The sisters have their beliefs, and there is no right or wrong in this situation with Matthew.
Matthew: I am intrigued by your claim that "there is no right or wrong in this situation.” Let's think about that claim.
- Bethany claims that souls, meaning, nonmaterial actual persons independent of the body, exist.
- Alexandria claims that souls, meaning nonmaterial actual persons independent of the body, do not exist.
Either souls, as nonmaterial, actual persons independent of the body, do or do not exist, right? Consider:
The cosmos is in some specific state, right now. Doesn't it seem that the state the cosmos is in determines what is true, independently of what we might believe?
- If that state of the cosmos includes souls as the person independent of the body, then souls are real, in which case Bethany’s claim corresponds to what is true about the cosmos and Alexandria’s claim fails to correspond to what is true about the cosmos. Which means that Bethany is correct, and Alexandria is wrong.
- On the other hand, if that state of the cosmos does not include souls as the person independent of the body, then souls are not real, Alexandria is correct, and Bethany is wrong.
We are not going to make progress in this quandary by proposing that there are no wrong answers, are we? How can we rule out errors if we assume that no opinion is wrong?
“Talk about no prisoners!” Bethany says, eyes locked on the screen.
Student: The sisters have their own reality. In Bethany’s reality, there are souls, so she will think about them when she’s deciding what to do. But in Alexandria’s reality, there are no souls.
Matthew: This is a great opportunity to think about the implications of having a basic orientation. Suppose you are correct that each of us inhabits our own unique reality: In this post, I am communicating with you. But if you are correct, it must be the you that appears in my reality. But if my reality is mine, then who is the you in your reality? It can’t be the you I’m communicating with, since that you is the you in my reality. So, maybe the you in my reality is the only you there is — which means you don’t have your own reality.
But, more practically, will this move actually solve the sisters’ quandary? Suppose souls exist in Bethany’s reality, but not in Alexandria’s reality. Now, suppose you encounter the sisters in a coffee shop: You must simultaneously have and not have a soul! The you in Bethany’s reality has (is) a soul, but the you in Alexandria’s reality doesn’t.
The score is now: one soul, and three yous — one in your reality, one in Bethany’s reality, and one in Alexandria’s reality.
“This is like . . . like having your brain wrung out!” Bethany cries. They laugh.
“Well, he did get one thing right,” Alexandria says, nodding.
“What’s that?”
“The unfamiliar territory thing.”
“Right,” Bethany muses, “but it’s also familiar, in some creepy way.”
They stare for a long moment. “It’s your turn,” Bethany says, at last.